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I. Introduction
Journalists have been called the “watchdogs” of society,
1
 tasked with 
gathering and disseminating what is going on in the world, informing the 
* J.D. Candidate 2017, Brigham Young University Law School, B.A., 2011, Communications,
Brigham Young University. I would like to thank Professor Eric Talbot Jensen for his advice and
direction on the article and Allan T. Brinkerhoff for his guidance and help editing the article.
1. The idea of the press being the watchdog of society is over 200 years old.  The press
being a watchdog means that it is constantly monitoring the government and public officials to 
expose any corruption or excess.  See Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A 
Legislative Proposal Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of 
Protection for Sources and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 106 (2002).   
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public, and ensuring governments and public figures are as accountable and 
transparent as possible.  This role is one of high honor and importance.
2
 
The third president of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, once 
penned, “Our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot 
be limited without being lost.”
3
  Similarly, Francois Delattre, the French 
representative to the United Nations, spoke about the importance of 
journalists when he said, “The freedom to provide information lies at the 
heart of every democracy . . . every day, journalists . . . help us better 
understand the world and its changes.”
4
 
Journalists face numerous risks while doing their job.  According to the 
Committee to Protect Journalists, 298 journalists have been killed in the 
past five years.
5
  In 2014 alone, 221 journalists were jailed worldwide, as 
well as a number of journalists who have gone missing.
6
  There have also 
been many counts of physical violence, sexual violence directed at female 
journalists, and government harassment of journalists participating in 
political expression.  While there are heightened risks that journalists 
knowingly take to do their job, the international community can better 
protect journalists from the dangers they often face. 
Currently, there is an international movement to better protect 
journalists
7
 and the international community is banding together, resolving 
to better implement current laws and norms that provide journalists with 
needed protection.  For example, on May 27, 2015, the United Nations 
Security Council adopted Resolution 2222, which advocated for the 
protection of journalists around the world in times of both armed conflict 
and peace.
8
  During the Security Council debate on the Resolution, Ioannis 
Vrailas, the Deputy Head of the European Union, urged nation states to 
“promote a safe environment for journalists . . . enabling them to carry out 
their work independently, without undo interference and without fear of 
2. See Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on Motion to Set
Aside Confidential Subpoena to Give Evidence, ¶ 25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
June 7, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/t020612.htm. 
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Currie, reprinted in NAT’L ARCHIVES (Jan. 28,
1786), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-09-02-0209. 
4. U.N. SCOR, 77th Sess., 7450th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7450 (May 27, 2015),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/pv.7450 [hereinafter The Rule of Law 
and Transitional Justice]. 
5. The Committee to Protect Journalists is a nonprofit organization whose aim is to 
promote the freedom of press worldwide. See generally COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, 
https://www.cpj.org/killed/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). 
6. 2014 Prison Census: 221 Journalists Jailed Worldwide, COMM. TO PROTECT
JOURNALISTS, https://www.cpj.org/imprisoned/2014.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
7. See S.C. Res. 2222 (May 27, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol=S/RES/2222(2015). 
8. Id.
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violence or persecution.”
9
  Further, journalist Mariane Pearl, the widow of 
another journalist who was killed in 2002, gave a passionate speech about 
the importance of journalists and cautioned that many governments are 
using national security issues to “clamp down on dissent and criticism.”
10
  
She pled for the Security Council to “warn States that they should not use 
national security as an excuse to jail, harass, or censor journalists.”
11
 
The resolution reaffirmed many goals, obligations, and laws that the 
international community has created to protect journalists, but the 
responsibility of nation states to refrain from detaining journalists under 
politically motivated claims of espionage is missing from the resolution 
and international law. 
Some nation states detain individuals on charges of espionage, 
particularly when there are national security risks involved.  International 
law needs to adopt a stricter standard to deter and prevent a nation state 
from detaining a journalist when the claims of espionage are politically 
motivated.  The standard needs to be stricter with respect to journalists due 
to their important work and the chilling effect that detaining journalists has 
on the rule of law. 
Currently, there is no uniform international standard for the protection 
of journalists against politically motivated claims of espionage.  This void 
allows governments to cloak politically motivated claims of espionage as 
“national security threats.”  The purpose of this paper is to propose an 
amendment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) to remove the void, by making Article 19 of the ICCPR a non-
derogated right for journalists who are reporting and participating in 
political expression. 
Part I of this article argues that journalists need greater protection by 
looking at the international rule of laws mandating a nation state’s 
obligation of transparency.  Part II explores how journalists should be able 
to rely on the right of freedom of speech in order to achieve the goal of 
transparency, and then look at how national security is used as an 
overbroad justification for the detention of journalists.  Part III identifies 
and examines current international laws that may already protect 
journalists—those regarding espionage and journalism.  Finally, Part IV 
proposes a change to existing international law that would impose a higher 
standard for states to meet before detaining a journalist on espionage 
charges.  The article will conclude in Part V. 
9. U.N. SCOR, 77th Sess., 7450th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7450 (Resumption 1) (May 
27, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7450(Resumption1). 
10. U.N. SCOR, 77th Sess., 7450th mtg., supra note 4, at 6.
11. Id. at 8.
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II. Transparency in Journalism
Protecting journalists from politically motivated claims of espionage is 
not only a good idea; it is necessary to achieve true procedural and legal 
transparency, which is already an articulable objective of international 
law.
12
  While there are many possible definitions of a “journalist” this 
paper will use the term to include “any correspondent, reporter, 
photographer, and their technical film, radio and television assistants who 




When a journalist reports or participates in political speech or political 
expression—defined in this paper as “speech that deals with matters of 
government, public officials, legislation, and so forth”
14
—they are 
providing transparency respecting governmental affairs.  This transparency 
can predictably collide with governmental claims of espionage which, for 
purposes of this paper, will be defined as “the consciously deceitful 
collection of information, ordered by a government or organization hostile 
to or suspicious of those the information concerns, accomplished by 
humans unauthorized by the target to do the collecting.”
15
  The 
reconciliation of “transparency” on the one hand, and “espionage” on the 
other hand could be greatly advanced with some amendments to 
international law in order to provide a more predictable “rule of law” on 
which journalists could rely. 
The Report of the Secretary-General for United Nations defined the 
rule of law as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions 
and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to 
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards.”
16
  The United Nations further explained that the rule 
of law includes adherence to “principles of supremacy of law, equality 
12. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004), http://www.un.org/ 
en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2004/616 [hereinafter The Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies] 
13. Isabel Düsterhöft, The Protection of Journalists in Armed Conflicts: How Can They Be
Better Safeguarded?, 29 UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUROPEAN L. 4, 8 (2013).  The reason to for this 
particular definition of a journalists is that it is well accepted.  
14. Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First Amendment: A Theory of Unprotected
Speech, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1896 (1992).  For the purposes of this paper, this will be the 
definition of political speech but a further discussion will occur in section 5 providing limitations 
to the definition.  See infra p. 36. 
15. Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT’L & 
POL’Y 321, 325–26 (1996). 
16. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 12, at 4.
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before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the 
law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.”
17
  The 
U.S. Department of Defense has explained that implementing the rule of 
law will need to account for cultural, economic, institution, and operational 
variables of the different countries.
18
  Journalists play a large part in 
helping provide transparency
19
 and the necessary protection against 
pretextual claims of espionage requires more than journalists can provide 
for themselves. 
A. Transparency Restricting Corruption
Transparency is one way to safeguard against government corruption.
The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression determined that “professionals in the 
field of information play a major role in the promotion and protection of 
freedom of opinion and expression.”
20
  Notably, corruption is not easily 
understood; rather “corruption takes many forms, but always involves the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”
21
  Consequently, corruption in 
government is a serious obstacle to the rule of law.
22
 
Governments and high-level governmental officials are typically 
entrusted with political power and thus, are often the perpetrators of the 
abuse.  Governments are unlikely to disclose or report their own abuse, and 
as a result, journalists supply a considerable amount of the force behind the 
battle against corruption.  Thus, when political speech is protected and the 
media has the freedom to participate in political speech, the resulting 
transparency leads to a reduction of corruption.
23
 
Journalists take on the significant responsibility of being the watchdogs 
of society, therefore it is no surprise that freedom of the media is the first of 
six areas that the World Governance Assessment Matrix focuses on when 
17. Id.
18. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, CTR. FOR LAW AND 
MILITARY OPERATIONS, Rule of Law Handbook: A Practitioner’s Guide for Judge Advocates, 1 
(2011).  
19. See Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 
(2011) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur]. 
20. Id.
21. What is Corruption?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/what-is-
corruption/#define (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
22. Id.
23. See Daniel Kaufmann, Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption, NAT.
RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INST. (Nov. 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=829244. 
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determining transparency.
24
  Moreover, journalists ensuring transparency is 
so important that many theorists have deemed the press the “Fourth Estate” 
because the chief responsibility of the press is to provide a check on 




There are many examples of journalists working to establish 
transparency in government.  Because of the work of journalists, the world 
was informed about the Watergate Scandal, the Genocide in Rwanda, and 
the atrocities promulgated in Chechnya.  In 1972, Carl Bernstein and Bob 
Woodward, two American journalists, helped ensure transparency in U.S. 
politics when they exposed President Nixon for breaking laws to help him 
win the presidential election.
26
  Additionally, in 1994 the world largely 
ignored the atrocities taking place in Rwanda until journalists, including 
photojournalist Simon Cox, published shocking photographs and stories of 
the brutality toward the Tutsi people.
27
  Comparably, Anna Politkovskaya, 
a Russian journalist, reported on the conflict and human rights violations 
happening in Chechnya.
28
  Politkovskaya helped provide transparency of 
the government behavior by informing the world of abuses committed via 
the army, police brutality, and corruption.
29
  As a result of Politkovskaya’s 
efforts to establish transparency by participating in political speech, both 
Russian and Chechen authorities intimidated, threatened, and detained her 
on several different occasions.
30
  In these three examples, the government 
officials in positions of power were promulgating the offenses, and the 
work of journalists exposed the officials and achieved transparency. 
24. The other five categories are: participation, fairness, decency, accountability, and
efficiency. Goran Hyden et al., Governance Assessment for Local Stakeholders: What the World 
Governance Assessment Offers 3 (Jan. 2008), http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/822.pdf.  
25. See Sheila Coronel, Corruption and the Watchdog Role of the News Media, in PUBLIC
SENTINEL: NEWS MEDIA AND GOVERNANCE REFORM (Pippa Norris ed. 2009). 
26. The Watergate Story, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics
/special/watergate/part1.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
27. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4T, Judgment, ¶ 116 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-
documents/ictr-96-4/trial-judgements/en/980902.pdf. 
28. See e.g., Anna Politkovskaya, Her Own Death, Foretold, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/14/AR2006101400805.html?na 
v=rss_print/outlook; Anna Politkovskaya, Slain Russian Journalist’s Last Article, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/13/world/europe/13chechnya-text.html?_r=0.  
29. Anna Politkovskaya, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/cases/
russia-anna-politkovskaya (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
30. Id.
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Journalists are not the only group of individuals who promote 
transparency and help adhere to the rule of law,
31
 but they are a large part 
of the equation.  Governments also have an obligation to adhere to the rule 
of law and provide transparency.
32
  One scholar concluded that it is a 
government’s obligation to see that “official business [is] conducted in 
such a way that substantive and procedural information is available to, and 
broadly understandable by, people and groups in society, subject to 
reasonable limits protecting security and privacy.”
33
 Unfortunately, while 
governments need to be part of the equation to effectively uphold the rule 
of law, their own self-interest can get in the way of transparency.  Instead, 
journalists often provide the accountability required to maintain the 
international rule of law regarding transparency. 
Before Anna Politkovskaya was murdered in 2006, she said, “I am 
exhausted. I have seen too much.  I don’t want to go back to Chechnya, but 
if I don’t who will?”
34
  The dedication that Politkovskaya displayed toward 
bringing attention to government corruption is not unique to her; rather it is 
a trait that many journalists share.
35
  Francois Delattre described the duty 
that journalists carry when he said, “We can all see that the first reflex of 
the enemies of freedom is to gag the press, and the first defenders of 
democracy are the independent media.”
36
 
The dedication that journalists display for their work and the great 
responsibility they carry for the struggle of transparency results in the need 
for increased protection.  The best safeguard for transparency is to have 
international laws in place that provide absolute protection when journalists 
are exercising their human right of freedom of speech. 
III. Freedom of Speech and Derogation for Purposes of Public
Emergency 
While transparency is part of the internationally defined rule of law 
that journalists work to protect, freedom of speech is the primary means by 
31. Justice and International Law, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/
priorities/justice-and-international-law/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (“The principle that 
everyone—from the individual right up to the State itself—is accountable to laws that are 
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated.”). 
32. Id.
33. Michael Johnston, Good Governance: Rule of Law, Transparency, and Accountability, 
UNITED NATIONS PUB. ADMIN. NETWORK, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/docu 
ments/un/unpan010193.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
34. U.N. SCOR, 77th Sess., 7450th mtg., supra note 4, at 7.
35. Press Freedom: Too Many Attacks Go Unpunished, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Nov. 22,
2013), https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/too_many_attacks_on_journalists_and_press_ 
freedom_go_unpunished. 
36. U.N. SCOR, 77th Sess., 7450th mtg., supra note 4, at 15.
 
176 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [38:2 
which journalists accomplish this goal.  Freedom of speech is a human 
right protected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”).
37
  The ICCPR is a human rights treaty that was adopted in 
1966 and put into effect in 1976.
38
  The treaty is significant because it is 
one of three documents (the other two being the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights) that comprise what is known as the International Bill of 
Human Rights.
39
  The treaty provides for “recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family . . . .”
40
  In the ICCPR, Article 19 asserts that “everyone shall have 
the right to hold opinions without interference” and “everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
orally, in writing or print, in the form of art, or through any other media of 
his choice.”
41
  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights further explains 
that it is impermissible for any “state group or person . . . to engage in any 
activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein.”
42
  Plainly stated, the freedom of expression is a 
protected human right and governments and other individuals in power 
should not do anything to harm or impede that right. 
For the benefit of society, the freedom of speech provides a way for 
journalists to report, participate in, and protect the internationally defined 
rule of law regarding transparency.  Francois Delattre explained the duty 
that governments have to help journalists fulfill this obligation when he 
said, “It is first and foremost the responsibility of Governments to protect 




While the right to freedom of speech is requisite for true transparency, 
there is a doctrine in international law that allows a state to briefly suspend 
its legal obligation to uphold these rights.  The derogation doctrine permits 
37. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. 95-
20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter “ICCPR”]. 
38. There are seventy-four signatories to the treaty, and the United States signed the treaty 
on October 5, 1977 and ratified it on June 8, 1992.  United Nations Treaty Collection, UNITED 
NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-
4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
39. FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR), ACLU, https://www.aclu.
org/faq-covenant-civil-political-rights-iccpr (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
40. ICCPR, supra note 37, at 172.
41. Id. art. 19.  The reason that Article 19 does not provide the adequate protection needed 
for journalists is that a state can derogate from it.  This will be further explained and a resolution 
provided later in the paper.  
42. G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 30 (Dec. 12, 1948).
43. U.N. SCOR, 77th Sess., 7450th mtg., supra note 4, at 15.
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a state to rescind some of its human rights obligations under very 
temporary and specific circumstances.  In other words, a state does not 
have to “guarantee” the right that would otherwise be protected, and the 
state can even inhibit the general public from enjoying the right.  Article 4 
of the ICCPR maintains that derogation is only permissible in times of 
“public emergency.”
44
  Examples of public emergencies include “. . . armed 




A. Current Laws Allowing a State to Derogate Human Rights
The ability of a government to suspend or ignore such obligations does
not apply to all human rights.  Unfortunately, the present derogation 
doctrine allows a government to ignore Article 19—which provides for the 
freedom of speech—in times of emergency.
46
  When a state decides to 
derogate from the obligation detailed in Article 19 of the ICCPR, it can 
infringe on the right that an individual has to speak freely. 
Article 4 of the ICCPR outlines when derogation is appropriate and 
freedom of speech is conspicuously not protected: 
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and 
the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the State Parties to the 
present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations 
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their 
other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination 
solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. 
No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16, 
and 18 may be made under this provision. 
Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right 
of derogation shall immediately inform the other State Parties to 
44. ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 4.
45. The rule of law in armed conflicts project looks at how international law is implemented
in both international and noninternational armed conflict.  It “systematically qualifies situations 
of armed violence in accordance with the definition of armed conflict under international 
humanitarian law.  It also reports on, and analyses, relevant national, regional, and international 
case-law.”  Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Situations of Emergency, RULE OF LAW 
IN ARMED CONFLICTS PROJECT, http://www.genevaacademy.ch/RULAC/derogation_from_ 
shuman_rights_treaties_in_situations_of_emergency.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).   
46. There are two different schools of thought to determine what a state is obligated to do 
with respect to derogation.  One theory reasons that a government’s obligation requires them to 
“provide” the right being protected.  The second theory holds that a government’s obligation does 
not require it to “provide” the right, rather it must not “infringe” on the right being protected.  The 
majority opinion has determined that the government’s obligation regarding freedom of speech is 
that the government cannot “infringe” on that right.  
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the present Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has 
derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated.  A further 
communication shall be made, through the same intermediary, on 
the date on which it terminates such derogation.
47
 
Derogation does not apply to core human rights, which are given more 
protection and security than other rights.  These core rights include the 
following: right to life; prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment; prohibition of medical or scientific experimentation without 
consent; and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
48
  Regardless of 
the situation or circumstance, no government, person, or entity can take 
away a nonderogable, core right.
49
 
For a nation state to legally derogate from its obligation to enforce a 
right, the state must also immediately inform the other parties to the ICCPR 
and provide the reasons for the derogation.
50
  These requirements protect 
individuals from a state that may take advantage of the doctrine of 
derogation and capriciously rid itself of the obligation to protect important 
human rights.  Unfortunately, when a government declares a state of 
emergency, it often leads governments to participate in “actions that are 




The General Assembly to the United Nations is concerned that during 
states of emergency, “many governments take aggressive action against 
freedom of expression in many different forms: by suspending TV news 
channels, blocking websites and telephone services, attacking detaining and 
arresting journalists covering protests and appointing government officials 
to monitor, and in effect censor, the content of newspapers.”
52
  One of the 
consequences of a state of emergency is that governments frequently act 
arbitrarily, and subjectively detain and arrest individuals without the 
normal legal safeguards in place.  When freedom of speech is not 
privileged and governments arbitrarily detain journalists, transparency 
47. ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 4.
48. Id. art. 6.
49. Core Human Rights in the Two Covenants, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE 
OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Sept. 2013), http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/IHRS/TreatyBodies/Page%20 
Documents/Core%20Human%20Rights.pdf.  
50. See ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 4.
51. G.A. Res. A/HRC/7/14, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development ¶ 44 (Feb. 28, 2008). 
52. Id.
   
2016 PROTECTING JOURNALISTS FROM POLITICALLY MOTIVATED CLAIMS OF ESPIONAGE 179 
becomes diminished. Thus, with transparency diminished, there is an 
increase of the likelihood of corruption. 
B. Derogation of Freedom of Speech
Reporters Without Borders, a nonprofit organization that works to
protect journalists and advocate for the freedom of information, annually 
publishes the World Press Freedom Index (“the Index”), which analyzes 
and ranks countries based on their protection of the freedoms of speech and 
information.
53
  To determine its rankings, the Index examines “media 
pluralism and independence, respect for the safety and freedom of 
journalists, and the legislative, institutional and infrastructural environment 
in which the media operate.”
54
  According to the 2015 Index there has been 
a “worldwide deterioration in the freedom of information . . . .  Beset by 
wars, the growing threat from non-state operatives, violence during 




The deterioration of freedom of information curbs the ability of 
journalists to successfully do their jobs, which leads to reduced 
transparency.  For example, in 2013, Japan passed a Special Intelligence 
protection bill aimed at keeping any national security intelligence classified 
with harsh sentencing standards for any whistleblower or journalist who 
leaked any “sensitive” information.
56
  Sensitive information includes 
“Japan’s maritime border disputes with China, and North Korea’s nuclear 
ambitions.”
57
  Reporters Without Borders released a statement opposing the 
law: “By imposing heavy penalties on those who obtain classified 
information in a ‘grossly inappropriate’ manner and then publish it, 
parliament is making investigative journalism illegal, and is trampling on 
the fundamental principles of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources and 
‘public interest.’”
58
  Japan’s relationships and the events transpiring with 
53. The organization lists five objectives in their mission statement: 1) is to continuously
monitor attacks on freedom of information worldwide, 2) to denounce any such attacks on the 
media, 3) to act in cooperation with governments to find censorship and laws aimed at restricting 
freedom of information, 4) to morally and financially assist persecuted journalists, as well as their 
families, and 5) to offer material assistance to war correspondents in order to enhance their safety.  
World Press Freedom Index 2015: Decline on All Fronts, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, 
https://index.rsf.org/#!/presentation (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Yoshihide Suga, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Press Conference (Nov. 7, 2013) (transcript
available at http://japan.kantei.go.jp/tyoukanpress/201311/07_a.html). 
57. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Urged to Abandon State Secrecy Bill, REPORTERS WITHOUT 
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both China and North Korea are important to the people of Japan and affect 
Japanese safety.  Penalizing journalists for reporting and sharing 
information labeled “sensitive” severely limits journalists to effectively do 
their jobs. 
C. Protection of Freedom of Speech
Some countries are doing a respectable job upholding a journalist’s
right to freedom of speech.  For the fourth year in a row, Finland is number 
one on the Index.
59
  In Finland it is “extremely rare for journalists to 
receive jail terms for what they write and there is a great deal of media 
pluralism.”
60
  Thus, Finland is successful because the government does not 
arbitrarily detain journalists, and allows journalists to share opinions and 
ideas that diverge from the government.  Journalists in Finland are entitled 
to freedom of speech and therefore they are able to ensure transparency. 
When looking at a journalist’s role in upholding the rule of law, it is 
freedom of speech that allows them to help transparency come to fruition, 
but there are also examples of journalists publishing sensitive information 
that have led to negative consequences.  For example, during the War on 
Terror, President Bush alleged that Osama bin Laden remained hidden by 
discarding his phone and changing his tactics and methods because the 
media reported about the use of his satellite phone.
61
  Additionally, a 
former Russian Military officer once penned, “I was amazed—and 
Moscow was very appreciative—at how many times I found very sensitive 
information in American newspapers.  In my view, Americans tend to care 
more about scooping their competition than about national security, which 
made my job easier.”
62
 
While there are times when journalists publish sensitive information 
that has unintended and potentially negative consequences, the press still 
needs to be given the benefit of the doubt due to the pertinent role they play 
in society.  In a landmark case from the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Black 
explained the importance of the freedom of the press when he wrote, 
The press was to serve the governed, not the governors.  The 
Government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that the 
press would remain forever free to censure the Government.  The 
59. World Press Freedom Index 2015: Decline on All Fronts, REPORTERS WITHOUT 
BORDERS, supra note 53. 
60. Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index 2014 (Latest) No. 1 Finland, America
No. 46th, LIVELEAK (June 17, 2015), http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=4c7_1434564407. 
61. Rachel Smolkin, Judgment Calls, AM. JOURNALISM REV. (2006), http://ajrarchive.
org/Article.asp?id=4185. 
62. STANISLAV LUNEV, THROUGH THE EYES OF THE ENEMY 135 (1998).
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press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government 
and inform the people.  Only a free and unrestrained press can 
effectively expose deception in government.
63
 
If greater restrictions are put on the press as a result of bad judgment 
calls by a few editors and journalists who publish sensitive information, 
journalists will be unable to fulfill their “watchdog” role in society.  
Additionally, greater restrictions on the freedom of speech will likely lead 
to an increased number of politically-motivated claims of espionage. 
D. Politically-Motivated Claims of Espionage Under the Guise of National
Security
One of the more serious ways that a nation state censors journalistic
freedom of speech is detaining journalists on politically motivated claims 
of espionage.  Suppression of freedom of speech by arbitrarily threatening 
or detaining journalists on these claims creates a chilling effect on the 
media and the rule of law regarding transparency cannot be realized.  As 
the following examples highlight, it is an unfortunate reality that as a result 
of providing transparency, journalists are often the first who are detained 
on these types of politically motivated claims.
64
 
In August 2015, Cameroon freelance journalist Simon Ateba was 
detained on espionage charges after investigating the conditions of a 
Nigerian refugee camp.
65
  The President of the Cameroon Journalist Trade 
Union, Dennis Nkwebo, condemned the arrest and acknowledged that 
“journalists suffer repression in the hands of military authorities” and that it 
was not uncommon for journalists in that area to be hauled into tribunals 
for possessing information without informing the government.
66
 
63. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971).
64. Suppressing the media with “national security” claims does not always result in 
espionage charges.  Alternatively, journalists are detained but not charged, or there are instances 
where government suspends the Internet and cell phones.  For example, dozens of reporters have 
been detained, but not charge with espionage, in Turkey because of the reporting they have done 
regarding the current conflict with the Kurdish people.  Additionally, in India it has been reported 
that “mobile Internet and communications are suspended in response to any unrest.”  Biggest 
Rises and Falls in the 2014 World Press Freedom Index, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Dec. 
16, 2014), http://www.mfwa.org/biggest-rises-and-falls-in-the-2014-world-press-freedom-index/.   
65. Journalist Detained for Four Days in Cameroon, Accused of Espionage, COMM. TO 
PROTECT JOURNALISTS, (Sept. 2, 2015, 10:18AM), https://cpj.org/2015/09/journalist-detained-
for-four-days-in-cameroon-accu.php.  
66. Cameroonian Journalists Union, CPJ, Others Condemn Arrest of Nigerian-Based
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Similarly, on July 22, 2014, Jason Rezaian, a Washington Post 
journalist, was arrested in Iran and charged with espionage.
67
  Rezaian, a 
dual citizen of the United States and Iran, was stationed in Iran as the 
bureau chief for the Washington Post and regularly wrote about the 
government and overall situation in Iran.
68
  After detaining him for almost 
15 months, the government of Iran found Rezaian guilty.
69
  The trial was 
held in secret and Iran has been unwilling to share any of the evidence that 
led to his arrest, detention, and ultimate conviction.
70
  John Hughes, the 
president of the National Press Club, issued the following statement after 
news of Rezaian’s conviction: 
Now it is time for the community of nations to step forward as one 
and demand the release of Jason Rezaian from prison in Iran.  
This has been a sham trial from the beginning.  The process was 
closed to the press.  There were no witnesses.  There was no 
evidence.  Jason is guilty of nothing.  He was taken from his home 
without charges and held without charges for months.  This is 
absurd.  No nation should be allowed to behave in this manner.  
These sham trials must stop.
71
 
The detentions of both Rezaian and Ateba exemplify the types of 
politically-motivated situations from which journalists need protection.
72
  
Notably, a journalist need not be formally charged with espionage for a 
chilling effect to take place; a government need only invade a journalist’s 
privacy during an investigation for the chilling effect to occur. 
In 2013, it was discovered that the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
was investigating Fox News reporter James Rosen under suspicion that he 
67. Aresu Eqbali, Washington Post Reporter Jason Rezaian Sentenced to Prison in Iran, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2015, 9:37 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/washington-post-reporter-
jason-rezaian-sentenced-to-prison-in-iran-1448198251.  
68. Id.
69. Editorial Board, Iran’s Cruel and Arbitrary Treatment of the Post’s Jason Rezaian, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/irans-cruel-and-arbitrar 
y-treatment-of-the-posts-jason-rezaian/2015/11/23/452af84c-9213-11e5-a2d6-f57908580b1f_stor
y.html.
70. Eqbali, supra note 67.
71. National Press Club Statement on Jason Rezaian Trial, THE NAT’L PRESS CLUB (Oct. 12, 
2015), http://www.press.org/news-multimedia/news/national-press-club-statement-jason-rezaian-trial.  
72. Jason Rezaian, and other American detainees, were released in January 2016.  They
were “set free in exchange for U.S. clemency offered to seven Iranians charged or imprisoned for 
sanctions violations and the dismissal of outstanding charges against 14 Iranians outside the 
United States.” Carol Morello et al., Plane Leaves Iran with Post Reporter, Other Americans in 
Swap, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iran-releases-post-co 
rrespondent-jason-rezaian-iranian-reports-say/2016/01/16/e8ee7858-ba38-11e5-829c-26ffb874a1 
8d_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-banner-high_rezaian-1030am%3Ahomepage%2Fstory.  
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was a possible co-conspirator regarding leaked classified information.
73
  
The Washington Post reported that the Obama Administration “pursued 
more leak investigations under the 1917 Espionage Act than all previous 
administrations combined” and that the investigators “pulled Rosen’s 
security badge records, phone logs and his personal emails.”
74
  While the 
DOJ brought no official charges, the incident created a stage for a 
discussion about the chilling effects of criminalizing the practices of 
journalists.  Seasoned journalist Brit Hume responded to the DOJ’s 
investigation by saying that they had crossed a “clear bright line” when 
seizing Rosen’s records.
75
  The White House’s response to the investigation 
was that reporters needed to be able to pursue investigative journalism, but 
they “had to be mindful of the need to protect classified information 
because of our national security interests.”
76
  When governments detain or 
threaten journalists on espionage claims, they often do so under the guise of 
“national security.” 
To understand national security, it is helpful to recognize when 
national security claims can or cannot be invoked.  The Siracusa Principles 
provide guidance on the limitation and derogation provisions in the ICCPR: 
1. National security may be invoked to justify measures limiting
certain rights only when they are taken to protect the existence of
the nation or its territorial integrity or political independence
against force or threat of force.
2. National security cannot be invoked as a reason for imposing
limitations to prevent merely local or relatively isolated threats to
law and order.
3. National security cannot be used as a pretext for imposing
vague or arbitrary limitations and may only be invoked when
there exists adequate safeguards and effective remedies against
abuse.
4. The systematic violation of human rights undermines true
national security and may jeopardize international peace and
security.  A state responsible for such violation shall not invoke
national security as a justification for measures aimed at
73. Justice Department’s Scrutiny of Fox News Reporter James Rosen in Leak Case Draws
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suppressing opposition to such violation or at perpetrating 
repressive practices against its population.
77
 
The main concern regarding national security arguments with respect 
to protection of freedom of speech is the likelihood that a state will abuse 
the notion of what constitutes a national security issue. 
Consequently, governments may make false claims regarding national 
security to justify suppression of political speech and detain those 
providing undesired overview and transparency.  The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe explained, through an analogous 
situation, that states can use “national security” to justify undesirable 
behavior when they explained that “large-scale intrusions of privacy in the 
name of national security are technically feasible and frequent today, and it 
can be assumed that other countries with a weaker democratic practice are 
using the same technologies for privacy intrusions, in particular against 
political opponents.”
78
  This example, while not addressing the use of 
national security claims to detain journalists, shows that governments are 
willing to justify unpopular or illegal actions by claiming that there is risk 
to national security.  In response to detention of journalists, David Kaye, 
the United Nations’ special investigator on freedom of speech as well as a 
professor of law at the University of California, Irvine has said, “We’re 
seeing this more and more, this abuse of national security as an excuse to 
rein in bad news.”
79
 
Reporters Without Borders illuminated the practice of governments 
using national security claims to suppress journalists when they explained 
that “[c]ountries that pride themselves on being democracies and respecting 
the rule of law have not set an example, far from it.  Freedom of 
information is too often sacrificed to an overly broad and abusive 
interpretation of national security needs, marketing a disturbing retreat 
from democratic practices.”
80
  National security claims often come in times 
of peace, but nation states, including those which “pride themselves on 
77. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Siracusa Principles on the Limitations and Derogation
Provisions in the Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex 
(1985).  They include relevant definitions and analysis on the concepts of both limitation and 
derogation.  Id.   
78. Eur. Parl. Ass., Nat’l Security and Access to Info. Comm. Op., Doc. No. 13315 (2013).
79. Frank Jordans, National Security Cited in Crackdown on Journalism Worldwide, 
ASSOC. PRESS (Sept. 8, 2015, 9:04 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fc79b8f9d7c84accb0597bef 
08418454/journalists-face-threat-terror-charges-reporting.  
80. Biggest Rises and Falls in the 2014 World Press Freedom Index, REPORTERS WITHOUT 
BORDERS, supra note 64. 
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being democracies” can also suppress journalists in times of war with false 
and overbroad claims of espionage.
81
 
In June 2015, the Office of General Counsel for the Department of 
Defense released a manual detailing the United State’s interpretation on the 
law of war.
82
  The Department of Defense explained: 
Reporting on military operations can be very similar to collecting 
intelligence or even spying.  A journalist may be subject to 
security measures and punished if captured.  To avoid being 
mistaken for spies, journalists should act openly and with the 
permission of relevant authorities. Presenting identification 
documents, such as the identification card issued to authorized 
war correspondents or other appropriate identification, may help 
journalists avoid being mistaken as spies.
83
 
The manual goes on to say that governments “may need to censor 
journalists’ works or take other security measures so that journalists do not 
reveal sensitive information to the enemy.”
84
 
Soon after the manual’s release, several institutions objected to and 
criticized the manual for the possible restrictions placed on the freedom of 
the press.  The New York Times Editorial Board argued:  
Allowing this document to stand as guidance for commanders, 
government lawyers and officials of other nations would do severe 
damage to press freedoms.  Authoritarian leaders around the 
world could point to it to show that their despotic treatment of 
journalists—including Americans—is broadly in line with the 
standards set by the United States Government.
85
Further, The Jerusalem Post explained that some of the criticism 
surrounding the manual stemmed from the fact that “[f]or better or worse, 
sometimes journalists get their best scoops by saying they are someone 
they are not or by claiming to have an approval to enter a restricted area 
despite lacking the said approval.  In the vast majority of these situations, 
81. Id.
82. Law of War Manual, DEP’T OF DEF. (June 12, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015.pdf. 
83. Id. at 174.
84. Id.
85. Editorial Board, The Pentagon’s Dangerous Views on the Wartime Press, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/opinion/the-pentagons-dangerous-views-
on-the-wartime-press.html?_r=0.  
 
186 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [38:2 
there is no nefarious purpose and often even genuine commitment to the 




Although the manual is not the law, but rather an explanation of the 
law, it still has the ability to determine how the Department of Defense—
their lawyers, military, and civilian personnel, etc.—should react to 
journalists doing their job in times of war.  The manual also sets a 
precedent for the world as to how journalists should be treated and what 
rights they are afforded.  The backlash on the Department of Defense was 
aimed at the suppression of the freedom of the press, the possible 
implications that the manual could have on the right of a free media to 




Journalists need protection both during times of peace and times of 
war.  Accordingly, the international community needs to create a standard 
that would serve as a protection for journalists from politically motivated 
claims of espionage irrespective of whether times of war or peace prevail. 
IV. Espionage, Journalism, and International Law
When looking to safeguard journalists from politically motivated 
claims of espionage, there are two areas of international law that potentially 
already provide such protection: international laws regarding espionage and 
international laws regarding journalism. 
A. International Laws Regarding Espionage
Espionage can be a difficult topic to understand in the international
context because there is very little international law to help define the 
circumstances and implications of a State participating in the activity.  
Professor A. John Radsan clarified the lack of law on this subject: 
Espionage and international law start from different points . . . 
espionage dates from the beginning of history, while international 
law, as embodied in customs, conventions, or treaties, is a more 
recent phenomenon . . they are also based on contradictory 
86. Yonah Jeremy Bob, Rule of Law: The Architect, THE JERUSALEM POST (Nov. 21, 2015,
9:06 AM), http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Rule-of-Law-The-Architect-434729. 
87. According to the Jerusalem Post, Charles Allen, a U.S. Department of Defense official,
is on record for saying that he stands by the law put forward in the manual but that the “wording 
of the manual could have been clearer to void controversy” specifically regarding journalists in 
time of war and that “he expects that there will be rewording of the manual on the journalists 
section in the manual’s first updates.” Id. 
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principles.  The core of espionage is treachery and deceit.  The 
core of international law is decency and common humanity.
88
 
The only definite international law regarding espionage is found in 
circumstances where the laws of war apply.  Article 46 of Protocol I
89
 
explains that if a member of a military is captured in uniform on enemy 
ground as a “scout,” she should be given the protection of a prisoner of 
war, but if that same member is captured without her military uniform and 
is acting under false pretenses, she will be considered a spy and not given 
the protections of a prisoner of war.
90
  Article 46 also provides that if a spy 
returns to her own territory and then is later captured, she will be given the 
protections afforded to a prisoner of war.
91
  Thus, as the only law directly 
addressing espionage, Article 46 provides no understanding of the legal 
88. A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28
MICH. J. INT’L L. 596, 623 (2007). 
89. Protocol I is a set of international laws that are additional to the Geneva Conventions
and are for the protection of Victims of International armed conflicts.  Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “Protocol I”].  Protocol 
I is to be used in armed conflict between people who are “fighting against colonial domination 
and alien occupations and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination . . . .”  Id. Preamble, art. 1.   
90. Id. art. 46. Article 46 states:
 1. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Conventions or of this Protocol, any
member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who falls into the power of an 
adverse Party while engaging in espionage shall not have the right to the status of
prisoner of war and may be treated as a spy.
 2. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who, on behalf of that Party 
and in territory controlled by an adverse Party, gathers or attempts to gather information
shall not be considered as engaging in espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform 
of his armed forces.
 3. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who is a resident of territory 
occupied by an adverse Party and who, on behalf of the Party on which he depends,
gathers or attempts to gather information of military value within that territory shall not
be considered as engaging in espionage unless he does so thorough an act of false 
pretense or deliberately in a clandestine manner.  Moreover, such a resident shall not
lose his right to the status of prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy unless he is
captured engaging in espionage.
 4. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who is not a resident of
territory occupied by an adverse Party who has engaged in espionage in that territory 
shall not lose his right to the status of prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy 
unless he is captured before he has rejoined the armed forces to which he belongs.
Id.  Under the Geneva Convention III, the status of a prisoner of war was expanded to include 
better-defined conditions of captivity, resources and relief that prisoners of war receive, defined 
due process rights, and the concept of their speedy release when active hostilities are stopped. 
Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter “Geneva Convention III”] 
91. Protocol I, supra note 89.
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implications of espionage during times when a State is not at war, or with 
respect to persons who are not members of armed forces. 
When analyzing espionage in times of peace, there are three views that 
international scholars embrace.  First, espionage is permissible under 
international law because it can be considered self-defense and it is not 
against the principle of jus cogens.
92
  Second, espionage is prohibited under 
international law because it “violates a duty that states have under 
international law to respect the territorial integrity and political 
independence of other states.”
93
  Third, espionage is neither legal nor 
illegal under international law.
94
  While there are compelling arguments 
supporting each of the three theories, there is no consensus as to which 
theory should prevail.  nation states are not willing to give up habits of 
spying on friends and foes alike,
95
 nor are they willing to publicly condone 
spying out of fear that doing so will provide justification for other states to 
spy on them.  Further, international law is widely accepted as being 
permissive, meaning that if something is not expressly prohibited, it is not 
forbidden.
96
  Thus, espionage law is not sufficiently developed to clearly 
exclude the detention of journalists when publishing political speech. 
B. International Laws Regarding Journalists
Areas of law regarding journalists exist, though they do not specifically
safeguard journalists against politically motivated claims of espionage. 
The first set of laws to protect journalists were enacted in the Lieber 
Code (“the Code”), adopted during the American Civil War.  Article 50 of 
the Code holds that “citizens who accompany an army for whatever 
purpose, such as sutlers, editors, or reporters of journals, or contractors, if 
captured, may be made prisoners of war, and be detained as such.”
97
  The 
92. Radsan, supra note 88, at 623.
93. Cmdr. Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International
Law, 46 A.F. L. REV. 217, 218 (1999). 
94. Radsan, supra note 88, at 623.
95. In 2013 Edward Snowden gave thousands of classified documents from the NSA to
journalists who later published them.  The documents included evidence of America spying on 
Germany and other allies.  While America is far from being the only country that participates in 
this type of behavior, it is one example of a country spying on friends.  Shira Ovide, ‘I Already 
Won,’ Says NSA Leaker Edward Snowden, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2013, 10:26 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/12/23/i-already-won-says-nsa-leaker-edward-snowden/; Anton 
Troianovski, Germany Warns U.S. About Spying on Its Officials, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2015, 9:35 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-requests-meeting-with-u-s-ambassador-over-new-
spying-leaks-1435850048.  
96. See generally Michael Jefferson Adams, Jus Extra Bellum: Reconstructing the
Ordinary, Realistic Conditions of Peace, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 377 (2014). 
97. General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States
in the Field art. 50, (Apr. 24, 1863). 
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Lieber Code became the basis for much of the law of armed conflict and 
the foundation for rights given to journalists. 
Following the Lieber Code, the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899 
included Article 13 which provided that “[i]ndividuals who follow an army 
without directly belonging to it, such as newspaper correspondents and 
reporters . . . have a right to be treated as prisoners of war, provided they 
can produce a certificate from the military authorities of the army they 
were accompanying.”
98
  This idea was also echoed in Article 13 of the 
1907 Hague Regulations
99




After World War II, the Geneva Convention III expanded the 
protection in Article 4(A): 
Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are 
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have 
fallen into the power of the enemy . . .  . Persons who accompany 
the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as 
civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, 
supply contractors, members of labour units or of services 
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they 
have received authorization from the armed forces which they 
accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an 
identity card similar to the annexed model.
101
 
This article affirms that journalists who are accompanying the military 
(i.e., embedded journalists
102
) are given the protection of a prisoner of war 
if they are captured.
103
  The protection of a prisoner of war is only given to 
journalists who accompany the military, not to journalists who are in an 
area of conflict on their own volition.  The difference is significant because 
the many journalists who are working in areas of armed conflict are not 
98. Hague Convention (II) Regarding the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899, 187 C.T.S. 429. 
99. International Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land art. 13, Oct.
18, 1907, 205 Stat. 277. 
100. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 81, July 27, 1929,
75 U.N.T.S. 135, 118 L.N.T.S. 343. 
101. Geneva Convention III, supra note 90, art. 4(A).
102. “[H]umanitarian law distinguishes between two categories of journalists working in 
conflict zones: war correspondents accredited to the armed forces and ‘independent’ journalists . 
. . .”  Alexandre Balguygallois, Protection des journalistes et des médias en période de conflit 
armé, 86 IRRC 37 (Mar. 2004) (Fr.), translated in Protection of Journalists and Media 
Professionals in Time of Armed Conflict, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Jan. 23, 2012), 
https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/case-study/protection-journalists-case-study.htm. 
103. Protocol I, supra note 89, art. 46.
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accompanying the military; they are on their own or with a private 
organization. 
In 1977, the Diplomatic Conference held in Geneva determined that 
journalists, embedded or not, are also considered “civilians” and enjoy the 
status and protection that any civilian enjoys.
104
  Article 75 of Protocol I 
explains that “persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and 
who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the 
Conventions . . . shall be treated humanely in all circumstances.”
105
  Thus, 
journalists are “protected both against the effects of hostilities and against 
arbitrary measures taken by a party to the conflict when they fall into that 
party’s hands, either by being captured or being arrested.”
106
 
Consequently, the current laws allow for journalists to be given 
prisoner of war status when embedded within the military and the 
protection that civilians normally hold in other situations.  While these two 
categories of law may provide some protection for journalists in armed 
conflict, they do not offer any protection in cases where a journalist is 
detained on politically motivated claims of espionage.
107
  As demonstrated 
above, the lack of developed law leaves little security for journalists and is 
inconsistent with a journalist’s role in providing needed transparency of 
governments and governmental officials.  Thus, in order to preserve the 
rule of law regarding transparency, stronger international laws must 
provide greater security and protection for journalists. 
V. Proposed International Standard
Although a nation state’s ability to protect itself from national security 
risks is an inherent right, there must be an international standard to protect 
journalists who uphold the rule of law—even in times of “national 
emergencies.”  When freedom of speech is particularly vulnerable, a 
government or regime might ignore existing rules of law, undertake to 
detain, silence, or censor the reporting and dissemination of information 
that is contrary to or criticizes the political views of those in power.  During 
such periods it is especially paramount for journalists to gather information, 
expose possible corruption, and ensure that governments, public figures, 
104. Id. art. 79.
105. Id. art. 75(1).
106. Balguygallois, supra note 102.
107. In times of peace the laws that protect journalists include state’s domestic laws and 
human rights laws.  As discussed earlier, the human rights laws that protect journalists include the 
freedom of speech and the media.  The domestic laws referenced above apply to individual nation 
states so there is no uniformity in the laws.  Some states have vigorous laws protecting journalists 
(Scandinavian countries), and some states have relatively little law to protect journalists.  ICCPR, 
supra note 37, at 19.   
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and their challengers are transparent and accountable.  However, in these 
instances, journalists are sometimes subjected to illegitimate and specious 
accusations of espionage.  Thus, a higher international standard is needed 
to protect the political expression of journalists. 
Undoubtedly there will be instances in which the rule of law or even an 
international standard will be ignored, but an unequivocal standard should 
exist to which appeal can be made and arguments fashioned to defend 
journalists who might be detained, arrested, or imprisoned.  The proposed 
international standard set forth below would be beneficial in several 
important ways.  First, beyond a binding international standard, it would 
stand as a model of a rule of law that could be adopted as domestic law by 
nations states who are, or could be convinced, that such additional 
protections are necessary.  Second, such a standard would provide a 
guideline and argument to use in proceedings to attempt to free journalists 
who are illegitimately charged and detained by governments and leaders 
who avoid transparency or oppose the dissemination of information about 
possible corruption, atrocities, or alternative viewpoints. 
Several paragraphs in the ICCPR address the subject matter at hand 
and could be amended to provide better protection to the journalistic right 
of political expression.  Specifically, Article 19 should be expanded to 
provide model language for protection, and Article 4 should be expanded to 
restrict the ability of a nation state to derogate from the right that a 
journalist has to participate in political expression.  It is therefore proposed 
that the ICCPR be amended to classify Article 19 as a nonderogable, core 
right when applied to journalists who are participating in political 
expression. 
Article 19 of the ICCPR should be amended to include a new 
paragraph 4.  The amendment would read: 
With respect to journalists, governments or nation states shall not 
apply false or pretextual restrictions of national security to restrict 
a journalist’s rights to: 
a. Exercise the freedom of political expression, including the
right to seek, receive, and impart information of any and all kinds,
either orally, in writing or print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.
b. Report and impart to any person, agency or entity information
dealing with matters of government, public officials (including
their political motives and actions), laws, legislation, living
conditions, acts of police, military, courts, prison systems, and the
enforcement of laws—with the narrow exception of information
that is deemed “classified.”
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The first sentence of the new paragraph 4 expands Article 19 to restrict 
a state’s use of false, illegitimate, pretextual, or self-protective claims of 
natural security to restrict a journalist’s right to freedom of speech and 
freedom of the media.  It is purposefully broad in order to encompass and 
suggest a comprehensive prohibition against restrictive measures against 
journalists.  Subsequently, the language of subdivision (a) incorporates the 
precise language of existing paragraph 2.  This language is adequately 
broad and leaves no doubt that political expression is included in the 
amendment. 
The language of subdivision (b) further expands the protections that 
Article 19 provides to journalists.  It specifically broadens the right of a 
journalist to comment on the activities and motives of government officials 
in order to avoid the limitations of language of the existing paragraph 3.  
This amendment is necessary because journalists will rely on this standard 
when they are performing their duty to gather and disseminate information, 
alert the world of corruption, and maintain government transparency and 
accountability.  This portion of the amendment allows the press to serve 
society rather than the government and to safely share their divergent 
opinions from the government.  The amendment supports journalists as 
they utilize the freedom of speech so that they are able to ensure 
transparency. 
The issue now becomes how nation states will define political 
expression.  Political expression and political speech is generally defined as 
“speech that deals with matters of government, public officials, legislation, 
and so forth.”
108
  It can include “suggestions to change the law, proposals 
for new policies, or criticisms of public official.”
109
  While this definition is 
correct, it is overly broad when applied to the absolute protection granted to 
journalists in the proposed amendment to Article 19.  Journalists need a 
higher level of protection when they are participating in political speech 
because they fulfill a crucial role by providing transparency and holding 
governments accountable for their actions.  However, to grant this absolute 
protection, the definition of expression must be narrowed to prevent abuse.  
If journalists use the duty and right of freedom of speech to incite violence, 
propagate hate, encourage illegal acts, or disseminate lies, they are not 
acting within the scope of the proposed protection. 
Political expression should not include inciting violence or propagating 
human right violations.  During the Nuremberg Trials, Julius Streicher, a 
journalist and author, was found guilty of “incitement to murder and 
108. Harel, supra note 14, at 1896.
109. Id.
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extermination” when he used his newspaper as a tool for anti-sematic 
rhetoric.
110
  Part of Streicher’s judgment read: 
[T]wenty-five years of speaking, writing, and preaching hatred of
the Jews, Streicher was widely known as “Jew-Baiter Number
One.”  In his speeches and articles, week after week, month after
month, he infected the German mind with the virus of anti-
Semitism and incited the German People to active persecution.
Each issue of Der Stürmer which reached a circulation of 600,000
in 1935, was filled with such articles, often lewd and
disgusting.
111
Examples of Streicher’s hateful propaganda include a picture of a Nazi 
pumping gas into a tree surrounded by dead rats with the captions: “When 
the vermin are dead, the German oak will flourish once more” and “[t]he 
enemy of the German people, the Jew is wading through an ocean of blood 
toward world domination.  He will have to die.”
112
 
Similarly, during the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, four 
journalists were convicted for campaigning for the ethnic cleansing of the 
Tutsis.
113
  In the judgment against the journalists, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda wrote: 
The newspaper and the radio explicitly and repeatedly, in fact 
relentlessly, targeted the Tutsi population for destruction.  
Demonizing the Tutsi as having inherently evil qualities, equating 
the ethnic group with “the enemy” and portraying its women as 
seductive enemy agents, the media called for the extermination of 
the Tutsi ethnic group as a response to the political threat that they 
associated with Tutsi ethnicity.
114
110. The Nuremberg Trial of 1946, 6 F.R.D. 69, 162 (1946).
111. Id. at 163.
112. Caricatures from Der Stürmer: 1927-1932, GERMAN PROPAGANDA ARCHIVE,
http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/sturm28.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2016); 
Julius Streicher Speaks to a Mass Meeting in Nuremberg, GERMAN PROPAGANDA ARCHIVE (Oct. 
31, 1939), http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/streicher3.htm.  
113. Robbie Corey-Boulet, Kenyan Trial Asks, Can Journalism Be a War Crime?, THE 
ATLANTIC (May 16, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/kenyan-
trial-asks-can-journalism-be-a-war-crime/238692/.  
114. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 320 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Dec. 3, 2003), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-
documents/ictr-99-52/trial-judgements/en/031203.pdf. 
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The above examples illustrate situations when a journalist’s speech 
does not fall into the category of “political expression.”  Journalistic 
political expression is substantiated when a journalist is properly informing 
the world of what she sees and providing transparency.  Thus, any 
journalists who use their duty to provide transparency of the government as 
a way of inciting terrorism or any imminent unlawful action should not fall 
under this exception. 
Since governments will likely be the entity that determines whether a 
journalist’s speech is “political speech” or speech that incites violence, 
there should be a presumption that a journalist is acting properly.  There are 
various ways that a government can rebut this presumption and make the 
determination as to whether the manifestations of a journalist fall under the 
umbrella of political expression.  When determining whether the speech 
incites violence, the United Kingdom has determined that it is necessary to 
look at the “overall context in which the statements or publications are 
made or distributed, including how they are likely to be understood, both 
by the general public and the intended recipients.”
115
  Alternatively, the 
United States has determined that it is a requirement to “prove both an 
intent to incite or produce unlawful action and the likelihood that the 
speech will actually incite imminent unlawful action.”
116
  Accordingly, for 
a government to rebut the presumption that a journalist’s speech is not 
appropriate political speech, and therefore unprotected, the government 
would have to prove that the individual was intentionally trying to incite an 




Next, the proposed subdivision (b) of paragraph 4 of Article 19 creates 
a narrow exception for the protection of “classified information.”  It is clear 
that a State has the right to govern and protect itself, and keeping privileged 
information classified helps nation states fulfill those objectives.  However, 
a State could easily use this narrow exception as a loop hole to make false 
accusations regarding national security, which would severely limit the 
effectiveness of the proposed amendments to both Article 19 and Article 4.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to create an international definition of 
115. The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS
AND CRIME, 39 ¶ 118. See, e.g., Brogan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 11209/84, 11 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 117, ¶ 61.3 (1988).  
116. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 115, 39 ¶ 119.
117. Intentionally inciting an unlawful action would be an example of the type of speech that
could be prohibited but there could be other types and situations that would provide an adequate 
basis for a state to censor a journalist (i.e., a journalists publishing classified information that 
contained military secrets and objectives).   
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“classified information,” though it should be addressed as a potential 
concern. 
Beyond the addition to Article 19, Article 4 of the ICCPR should be 
expanded to make Article 19.4 a nonderogable right.  After the expansion 
(shown in bold below), the addition in Article 4 would read: 
No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 
16, 18 and 19 (paragraph 4) may be made under this 
provision.
118
The ICCPR may adequately defend the right of individuals to hold 
opinions, freedom of expression, freedom of dissemination, freedom of 
media, and freedom of speech.  However, this protection will not be 
sufficient—regardless of how well-written or broad Article 19 is—if a state 
is able to derogate from that obligation.  It does not matter how temporary 
or proportional the derogation is; a state cannot successfully abide by the 
rule of law on transparency if they are able to infringe on a journalist’s 
freedom of speech.  Therefore, Article 4, paragraph 2, should include 
language that prohibits derogation of the rights granted for journalists 
participating in political speech in proposed paragraph 4 of Article 19. 
Thus, if the ICCPR declares that national security cannot be used as a 
false pretext for derogation from Article 19, and an exception for 
journalists participating in political speech is added for when states can 
legally derogate from Article 19, journalists will enjoy stronger protection.  
These two proposed changes will more effectively guard journalists from 
politically-motivated claims of espionage, which will lead to greater 
transparency and the rule of law will be upheld. 
IV. Conclusion
When Anna Politkovskaya unforgettably expressed, “I am exhausted. I 
have seen too much.  I don’t want to go back to Chechnya, but if I don’t 
who will?”
119
 she stood as an example of the best of what journalists have 
to offer.  She fought tirelessly for the rule of law through transparency to be 
upheld in both Chechnya and Russia.  As a consequence of her dedication, 
she died as a martyr for her cause.  Journalists are truly the watchdogs of 
society.  There are countless examples of journalists who have sacrificed 
their freedom, health, safety, and even their lives so that they can 
accomplish the goals of gathering and disseminating what is going to on in 
118. ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 4.
119. U.N. SCOR, 77th Sess., 7450th mtg., supra note 4, at 7.*
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the world, of informing the public, and keeping governments and public 
figures accountable and transparent. 
When democracy is threatened, freedom is endangered, and liberty is 
vulnerable, the press is the first—and at times can be the last—line of 
defense before governments cross the line of corruption and promulgate 
acts against human rights.  Because journalists play such an important role 
for society, international laws need to be changed.  Current law may allow 
restriction of freedom of speech during times of public emergency, but it 
ought never be justified to restrict the freedom of speech for journalists 
engaged in political expression.  By making the right granted in Article 19 
a non-derogable human right for journalists, the rule of law regarding 
transparency will be upheld, and politically-motivated claims of espionage 
will be deterred. 
